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I. Introduction
As W. H. Auden famously observed, "Murder is unique in that it abolishes the
party it injures, so that society has to take the place of the victim and on his
behalf demand atonement or forgiveness; it is the one crime in which society has
a direct interest."' So when Humberto Leal Garcia was found guilty for the bru-
tal rape and murder of 16-year-old Adria Sauceda, it was no surprise that the
State of Texas demanded atonement.
Garcia, a Mexican national that had lived in the United States since the age of
two, was arrested and subsequently convicted of capital murder in July 1995.2
Following his arrest, however, law enforcement officials at no time informed him
of his right under international law to contact the Mexican consulate for assis-
tance with his defense.3 On February 4, 1998, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
t J.D. expected May 2012, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I W.H. Auden (quote is available at http://thinkexist.com/quotes/w._h._auden/3.html).
2 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
3 Id.
Volume 9, Issue 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 347
Don't Mess With Texas
peals affirmed Garcia's conviction and sentence.4 Meanwhile, the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") issued an order calling on the United States to review
Garcia's case with a view to ascertaining if denial of his rights under interna-
tional law prejudiced the administration of justice.5 The ICJ found that the
United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna
Convention") when law enforcement officers in Texas failed to notify Garcia,
along with fifty-one other Mexican nationals, of their right to access their consu-
late after arrest.6
While in prison awaiting execution, Garcia learned of his right to notify the
Mexican Consulate of any legal proceedings against him with an eye towards
securing legal counsel.7 In fact, Garcia learned of his rights not from any law
enforcement officer or attorney, but from another death row inmate - and a full
two years after his capital sentence was handed down.8 After being made aware
of the situation, the Obama administration filed an amicus brief in Garcia's case
and requested the U.S. Supreme Court to stay Garcia's execution. 9 Despite this
high-level intervention, the State of Texas put Humberto Leal Garcia to death by
lethal injection on the evening of July 7, 2011.10 In allowing Garcia's execution
to proceed, the Supreme Court ruled that the ICJ order was unenforceable as
domestic law and therefore not binding on the State of Texas."
Part II of this Note discusses the relevant international agreements as well as
the International Court of Justice, forming the backdrop against which Garcia v.
Texas was decided. That Part also includes a discussion of Medellin v. Texas, the
seminal case that shaped the jurisprudence surrounding the Garcia case. Part III
contains an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court's holding in Garcia, includ-
ing a discussion of the dissenting opinion issued by Justice Stephen Breyer. Part
IV situates the Garcia decision in the larger debate regarding treaty interpreta-
tion, executive powers, and legislative implementation of the rights at issue in
this case. Finally, Part V looks at the potential negative impact that Garcia could
have on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations and the steadily diminishing power
of the president in this area of foreign relations.
4 Garcia v. Thaler, 793 F.Supp.2d 909, 921 (W.D. Tex 2011) (citing State v. Leal, No. 72,210 (Tex.
Crim. App. Feb. 4 1998) (unpublished opinion)).
5 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 12, 14 (Mar. 31).
6 Id.
7 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. at 2867.
8 Adam Liptak, Texas is Pressed to Spare Mexican Citizen on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/28bar.html.
9 Brief for the United Sates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Applications for a Stay at 1, Garcia, 131
S.Ct. 2866 (2011).
10 Adam Liptak, Mexican Citizen Is Executed as Justices Refuse to Step In, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/us/08execute.html.
11 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (interpreting Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)).
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II. Background
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in
1969.12 Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the United States has an
obligation to timely notify detained foreign nationals of their right to notify their
consulate and to facilitate such communication.13 The language embodying these
obligations appears in the following provisions:
(1)(a) [C]onsular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending
State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with
and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(1)(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or commit-
ted to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other man-
ner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the per-
son concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.14
Unfortunately, the United States has a history of non-compliance with the lat-
ter provision of the section because law enforcement officers at all levels often
fail to provide notice "without delay" to foreign nationals of their right to com-
municate with their consulates.' 5 As a result, consulates are often unaware when
citizens and nationals from their countries have been detained in the United
States.16 This has the potential to be particularly problematic because many of
the remaining rights provided to detained foreign nationals under Article 36 are
12 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820; see also Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
13 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, an. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820
[hereinafter "Vienna Convention"].
14 Id. art. 36(l)(a)-(b).
15 The United States' failure to give notice and lack of consular access under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention was at issue in two additional cases filed in the ICJ against the United States: Paraguay v.
U.S., 1998 1.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
16 See e.g. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). In the LaGrand Case, brothers
and German nationals Karl and Walter Bernhard LaGrand orchestrated an armed bank robbery in
Marana, Arizona, killing a man and severely injuring a woman in the process. Id. at 1 14. They were
convicted and sentenced to death unbeknownst to their home country of Germany, who was made aware
of the legal proceedings only after the Arizona Supreme Court rejected their challenges, effectively up-
holding the convictions and sentences. Id. at 1 19.
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contingent upon their knowledge of access to their consulate, or conversely, the
consulate's knowledge of their arrest.' 7
Consequently, because the United States is a party to the Vienna Convention
and because it at one time acceded to the Optional Protocol ("Protocol"), ag-
grieved nations have been able to file suit in the ICJ when apparent violations
have occurred.' 8 The Optional Protocol states that "[d]isputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the [ICJ]," and that any state party to the Protocol can bring suit
against any other party to the Protocol.' 9 While the United States is still party to
the Vienna Convention, it withdrew from the Optional Protocol in March 2005.20
Tellingly, perhaps, one reason articulated for the United States' withdrawal from
the treaty was that other state parties often sued the United States for failure to
give foreign nationals the requisite consular notification. 21
B. The ICJ's Avena Decision
In 2003, while Garcia's first petition for federal habeas corpus relief was
pending before a district court in Texas, the government of Mexico initiated a
cause of action against the United States in the ICJ, alleging violations of the
Vienna Convention. 22 Mexico filed its complaint on behalf of Garcia and fifty-
three other Mexican nationals (including the named plaintiff, Avena), each of
whom had been sentenced to death in state criminal proceedings. 23 Mexico
sought relief both on its own behalf and, in the exercise of its right of diplomatic
protection, on behalf of its nationals, specifically including Garcia by name.2 4
The ICJ heard the case in December 2003 and issued a final judgment in March
of 2004.25 In the resulting Avena judgment, the ICJ expressly adjudicated Gar-
cia's own rights, as well as those of the other nationals on whose behalf Mexico
sought relief.26
As a general matter, the ICJ found that authorities in Texas violated Garcia's
Vienna Convention rights. 27 In particular, the ICJ held that the United States,
acting through various state and local officials, had breached its obligations under
17 Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36(l) (c). For example, consular officers would be unable
to visit their detained national citizen for the purpose of arranging legal representation without knowl-
edge of the detention.
18 See Optional Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36.
The United States is no longer a party to the Optional Protocol, having withdrawn in March of 2005.
19 Id.
20 John Quigley, The United States' Withdrawal from International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in
Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DuKE_ J. COMP. & INT'L L. 263, 265 (2009).
21 Id. at 266.
22 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 12, 12 (Mar. 31).
23 Id.
24 Id. 16.
25 Id.
26 Id. 1 40, 106.
27 Id. at 1 106.
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Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention to "inform detained Mexican nationals
of their rights." 28 In forty-nine of those cases, again including Garcia, the ICJ
also found that the United States breached its international obligations when offi-
cials failed "to notify the Mexican consular post of their detention." 29 In the
cases of Garcia and forty-eight other Mexican nationals, the ICJ further held that
the United States had breached its obligation under Article 36(1)(a) "to enable
Mexican consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nation-
als, as well as its obligation under paragraph 1(c) of that Article regarding the
right of consular officers to visit their detained nationals." 30 Furthermore, in the
case of Garcia and thirty-three additional Mexican nationals, the ICJ added that
the United States had failed to "enable Mexican consular officers to arrange for
legal representation of their nationals." 3 '
The ICJ then turned to the remedies that would be available for breaches of the
Vienna Convention. It held that the United States must provide "review and
reconsideration" of the convictions and sentences imposed on Garcia and the
other Mexican nationals in whose cases it found violations. 32 The ICJ specified
the nature of the review and reconsideration that the United States would need to
provide Garcia.33 First, the Avena judgment required that review and reconsider-
ation must take place "within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the indi-
vidual defendant concerned." 34 Second, procedural default doctrines could not
bar the required review and reconsideration where authorities of the detaining
State had themselves failed in their obligation to notify.35 Third, the review and
reconsideration must take account of the Article 36 violation on its own terms
and not require that it qualify also as a violation of some other procedural or
constitutional right under state law. 3 6 Finally, the forum in which the review and
reconsideration occurs must be capable of "examining the facts, and in particular
the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of the rights set forth
in the Convention."37
C. The Medellin v. Texas Cases
On March 25, 2008, while Garcia's appeal was pending before the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Medellin v. Texas ("Me-
dellin r").38 In Medellin I, the Supreme Court held that neither the Avena
28 Id. at 106(1).
29 Id. at IT 106(l)-(2), 153(4)-(5).
30 Id. at 106(3), 153(6).
31 Id. at 106(4), 153(7).
32 Id. at is 14, 121-22, 153(9).
33 Id. at 111-13.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1 120-22.
36 Id. at 9N 133-34.
37 Id. at 138-41.
38 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008).
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judgment nor President George W. Bush's commitment to comply with the ICJ's
Avena judgment constituted directly enforceable law in the United States.39 The
Court, for its part, acknowledged that the United States is obligated as a matter of
international law to comply with the Avena judgment, noting, "No one disputes
that the Avena decision - a decision that flows from the treaties through which
the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to the Vienna Con-
vention disputes - constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the
United States."40 To be sure, the Court was unanimous on this point.41 In re-
sponse, the Medellin I Court clarified the means available to the United States to
come into compliance with its obligations under Avena, including legislative im-
plementation by Congress. 42 Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring in the judg-
ment but not the opinion, urged the State of Texas to effect statewide compliance
with Avena, noting that the "United States' obligation to 'undertake to comply'
with the ICJ's decision falls on each of the States as well as the Federal Govern-
ment."43 As Justice Stevens pointed out, "the fact that the President cannot legis-
late unilaterally does not absolve the United States from its promise to take
action necessary to comply with the ICJ's judgment.""4
All nine justices of the Supreme Court also recognized that the United States
has a vital public interest in complying with its obligations under Avena.45 Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts noted, "[In] this case, the Presi-
dent seeks to vindicate United States interests in ensuring the reciprocal
observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign govern-
ments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law," interests
he found "plainly compelling." 46 Justice Stevens agreed that "the costs of refus-
ing to respect the ICJ's judgment are significant."47 Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, observed in his dissenting opin-
ion that noncompliance with the Avena judgment would exact a heavy toll on the
credibility of the United States in the international community.48
Despite this abstract recognition of the importance of complying with an ICJ
decision, the Court in its holding came to the opposite conclusion. 49 In the end,
39 Id.
40 Id. at 504 (construing the U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
41 Id. at 504, 531, 538-39.
42 Id. at 520.
43 Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 524, 537, 560.
46 Id. at 524
47 Id. at 537.
48 Id. at 566. Justice Breyer expressed his concern over "increasing the likelihood of Security Council
Avena enforcement proceedings, worsening relations with our neighbor Mexico, precipitating actions by
other nations putting at risk American citizens who have the misfortune of being arrested while traveling
abroad, or diminishing our Nation's reputation abroad as a result of our failure to follow the 'rule of law'
principles that we preach." Id.
49 Id. at 532.
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the Court voted not to stay Jose Medellin's execution.50 It concluded that ICJ
judgments in general are non-binding as domestic law, treating them instead as
non-self-executing international obligations requiring affirmative action by Con-
gress to become binding as domestic law.5 '
Quoting a decision of the First Circuit, the majority found that, "while treaties
may comprise international commitment. . .they are not domestic law unless
Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on those terms." 52 Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that "because none of the treaty sources creates binding federal
law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that
no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena decision is not automati-
cally binding domestic law."5 3 Ultimately, the majority equated the Optional
Protocol to a "bare grant of jurisdiction," similar to "compulsory non-binding
arbitration." 54 Thus, the ICJ's decisions are not binding as domestic law and
must instead be implemented specifically through federal statute to have any
effect. 55
Furthermore, the Court construed the language of Article 94(1) of the UN
Charter, in which "each member of the UN undertakes to comply with the deci-
sion of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party," to create only a commitment by
each UN member to take future action to achieve compliance through its respec-
tive political branches.56 It held that the Supreme Court has no authority to en-
force or implement ICJ decisions on its own. 5 7 Additionally, it noted that no
other signatory nation treats ICJ judgments as automatically binding.58 Conse-
quently, the Court found that it was in no position to enforce ICJ judgments as
binding domestic law in the absence of clear implementing statutes passed by
Congress or action on behalf of the Executive.59
As a result of this decision, Congress considered the Avena Case Implementa-
tion Act of 2008, which would have granted foreign nationals the right to judicial
review of their convictions and sentences to the extent that there existed Vienna
Convention violations.60 However, in the follow-up case, Medellin II, the Su-
preme Court again denied a stay of execution for Medellin based on the mere
proposal of this legislation in the House of Representatives. 6 ' The Court rea-
50 Id.
51 Id. at 510-ll.
52 Id. at 505, n. 2 (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)).
53 Id. at 505-06.
54 Id. at 507.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 492.
57 Id. at 508-09.
58 Id. at 510.
59 Id. at 510-ll.
60 Id.
61 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2008) (per curium) (highlighting the re-
mote possibility of the Avena Bill passing). The Court stressed, "[N]either the President nor the Governor
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soned that neither the president nor the Department of Justice seemed to support
the proposed legislation, and thus the enactment of the Avena Bill was too re-
mote a possibility to set aside Medellin's verdict.62 The Court further empha-
sized, and notably extended the scope of its holding in Medellin I, that Medellin
was not prejudiced by his lack of consular access. 63
D. Further Proceedings before the ICJ (2008-09)
Mere months after Medellin v. Texas had been decided, Mexico again turned
to the ICJ. On June 5, 2008, Mexico filed a Request for Interpretation of the
Avena judgment, asking the ICJ to declare that the United States has an obliga-
tion to use any and all means necessary to provide judicial review and reconsid-
eration mandated by the Avena judgment before any execution is carried out. 6 4
In conjunction with its Request for Interpretation, Mexico also asked the ICJ to
indicate provisional measures with respect to Garcia and four other Mexican na-
tionals named in the Avena judgment, each of whom faced imminent execution in
Texas.65
The ICJ held oral proceedings as to Mexico's request for provisional measures
on June 19 and 20, 2008. At oral argument, the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of
State confirmed, "[t]he United States takes its international law obligation to
comply with the Avena judgment seriously" and agreed that Avena requires U.S.
courts to provide review and reconsideration prior to carrying out a death
sentence.66
Upon issuing its judgment, the ICJ refrained from issuing a reinterpretation of
Avena.67 However, it did hold that the United States had violated its interna-
tional legal obligations by executing Jose Medellin. 68 The ICJ declared that the
United States' commitments under Avena "must be met within a reasonable
amount of time" and noted that the United States "has insisted that it fully ac-
of the State of Texas has represented to us that there is any likelihood of congressional or state legislative
action." Id.
62 Id. The dissenting justices believed the Court should grant the stay of execution in order to seek
the views of the Solicitor General. Id. at 761-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 760.
6 See Request for Interpretation of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexi-
can Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. 139, [ 6, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
pI=3&p2=1&code=&case=139&k= I1 (last visited March 8, 2012) (the application, incidental proceed-
ings, the parties' written and oral pleadings and judgment, orders and press releases of the ICJ in respect
to the Request for Interpretation can be accessed by clicking on the applicable link) [hereinafter "Request
for Interpretation"].
65 Id.
66 Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Request for Reinterpretation of the Judgment of 31 March
2004 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. 139, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14592.pdf.
67 Request for Reinterpretation, of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment of 19 January 2009, 156 & 61(4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/I 39/14939.pdf.
68 Id. [ 61(2).
354 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 2
Don't Mess With Texas
cepts" this obligation. 69 Meanwhile, it emphasized "the obligation upon the
United States not to execute Humberto Leal Garcia [and other Mexican nation-
als] pending review and reconsideration being afforded is fully intact."70
III. Discussion
A. Procedural Disposition Leading up to Garcia v. Texas
In July 1995, Garcia was convicted of capital murder and, upon the jury's
recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to death.7' On February 4, 1998,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Garcia's conviction and sentence
in an unpublished opinion. 72 The Texas Supreme Court denied his habeas peti-
tion on October 20, 1999, and, after he sought federal relief, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Garcia's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 20, 2004.73
On October 13, 2005, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his request for a
Certificate of Appealability.74 On April 17, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari.75
Based on a memorandum issued by President George W. Bush calling for the
United States to implement all obligations enumerated by the Avena decision,
Garcia filed a subsequent application in the Texas state courts seeking enforce-
ment of the rights he was denied. 7 6 On March 7, 2007, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that state rules of criminal procedure barred reconsideration of a
subsequent post-conviction application, even though it was filed pursuant to
Avena and the president's determination.7 7 Again unsuccessful, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals dismissed Garcia's application, citing to its decision and the
incorporated reasoning in Medellin.78 On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari.79
Along with his petition in state court, Garcia immediately filed a petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court seeking relief based on the Avena judgment and Presi-
dent Bush's Memorandum. 80 On December 17, 2007, the Supreme Court barred
69 Id. 1 27-28.
70 Id. 1 54.
71 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
72 Garcia v. Thaler, 793 F.Supp.2d 909, 921 (W.D. Tex 2011) (citing State v. Leal, No. 72,210 (Tex.
Crim. App. Feb. 4, 1998) (unpublished opinion)).
73 Leal v. Dretke, 2004 WL 2603736 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
74 Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d. 543 (5th Cir. 2005).
75 Leal v. Dretke, 547 U.S. 1073 (2006).
76 Second Subsequent Application For Post-Conviction Writ Of Habeas Corpus Or, In The Alterna-
tive, Suggestion to Reopen Previous Proceeding on Court's Own Motion, Ex Parte Humberto Leal,
Cause No. 96-cr-4696, 2007 WL 678628, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
77 Id. (citing to Texas Criminal Procedure Code Article 11.071, § 5). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals also relied on its incorporated reasoning in Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
78 Id. (citing Medellin 1, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008)).
79 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
80 Petition to Supreme Court for Habeas Relief, Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866 (2011).
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Garcia's petition as a successive petition, and, absent any response or briefing
from Respondent, the Court alternatively adjudicated the merits of Garcia's
claim.8 ' The Supreme Court granted a Certificate of Appealability, and Garcia
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. 82
B. Majority Opinion
In a per curium opinion, the majority on the Supreme Court denied both Gar-
cia's application to stay his execution and his petition for writ of habeas
corpus.83 Addressing both applications together, the Court found Garcia's argu-
ments unpersuasive. 84 Garcia's asserted basis for relief pointed to the legislation
simultaneously under consideration in Congress to implement the holding of the
ICJ's order in Avena.85 He contended that the Due Process Clause prohibits
Texas from carrying out his death sentence while such legislation is under
consideration. 86
An amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Executive
presented an alternative basis for relief.87 The Obama administration requested
the Supreme Court to stay the execution until January 2012 in support of the
Court's "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding" under legis-
lation introduced in the Senate.88 Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, this bill
had the Executive Branch's endorsement and support. 89
The Court, however, rejected these arguments. 90 The majority found it unper-
suasive and inappropriate to stay a lower court judgment on account of proposed
legislation, asserting that its "task is to rule on what the law is, not what it might
eventually be."'91 Incorporating its decisions in Medellin I and Medellin II, the
Court further refused to grant Garcia's application for stay because "there is no
fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below
was erroneous." 92 Accordingly, without guiding precedent or hope for success,
the majority denied Garcia's application to stay the execution.93
Expounding upon its determination, the majority drew a comparison to the
case of Jose Medellin. As discussed above, Jose Medellin appealed to the Court
to stay his execution on the ground that Congress might enact implementing leg-
81 Leal v. Quarterman, 2007 WL 4521519, at *4-7 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
82 Id. at *7.
83 Garcia, 131 S.Ct. at 2867.
84 Id. at 2867-68.
85 Id. at 2867.
86 Id.
87 U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 2-3, n. 1.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
91 Id.
92 Id. (quoting O'Brien v. O'Laughlin, 130 S.Ct. 5, 6 (2009) (discussing the traditional multi-factored
analysis the Court has adopted when considering an application to stay a prisoner's execution)).
93 Id.
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islation.94 The Court denied Medellin's application, explaining that "Congress
has not progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since
the ICJ ruling and the four months since [the Court's] ruling in Medellin v. Texas
(Medellin 1)."95 Taking a similar tone to that adopted in the Medellin opinion,
the Garcia Court reasoned that, "[i]f a statute implementing Avena had genuinely
been a priority for the political branches, it would have been enacted by now."96
Moreover, the majority dismissed the potential for "grave international conse-
quences" that may flow from Garcia's execution.97 The Court put significant
stock in Congress's refusal to promptly enact legislation implementing the Avena
judgment, finding this to be an indication that Congress did not view these conse-
quences sufficiently grave to spur it to action. 98 Without action from Congress,
the Court found no authority to stay an execution merely in light of an appeal by
President Bush of what it considered "free-ranging assertions of foreign policy
consequences" unaccompanied by any "persuasive legal claim." 99
Finally, the majority reiterated its reasoning from Medellin II, namely that
"[tlhe beginning premise for any stay . . . must be that petitioner's confession
was obtained unlawfully," and "the United States has not wavered in its position
that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular access." 00 According
to the Court, the circumstances of Garcia's appeal are inapposite because the
United States had refused to argue that Garcia was prejudiced by the Vienna
Convention violations, contending instead that the Court should stay the execu-
tion simply in light of "the possibility that [Garcia] might be able to bring a
Vienna Convention claim in federal court, regardless of whether his conviction
will be found invalid."o'0 The majority explicitly declined to take this position,
finding no merit in the suggestion of granting a stay in view of "hypothetical
legislation," especially when the United States had not argued that Garcia's at-
tempt to overturn his conviction had any prospect of success.10 2
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent in this case was penned by Justice Stephen Breyer and is largely
reminiscent of his similar dissent in Medellin I.103 Justice Breyer began by point-
ing out that the United States is bound by the Vienna Convention to timely notify
foreign nationals arrested in the United States of their right to request assistance
94 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2009).
95 Id.
96 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2868 (2011).
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. (quoting Medellin II, 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2009)).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Ilya Shapiro, Medellin v. Texas and the Ultimate Law School Exam, 2008 CA1o SUP. CT. Re'v.
63 (2008).
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from their home country's consulate.'0 Furthermore, Justice Breyer found that
the United States is bound by its obligation to abide by ICJ judgments regarding
disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention through its signing of the Optional
Protocol. 0 5 This obligation precluded withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
because, according to Breyer, "withdrawal does not alter the binding status of its
prewithdrawal obligations." 0 Accordingly, Justice Breyer found it troubling
that, at the time Garcia's case was before the Supreme Court, no judicial author-
ity had yet implemented what the ICJ had called for in its Avena judgment - a
hearing to determine whether the violation amounted to harmless error. 07 Ad-
dressing the majority, the dissent found the ICJ's focus on procedural require-
ments to trump a domestic court's "guesses as to the results of that procedure,"
rendering them largely irrelevant for purposes of implementing U.S. treaty obli-
gations.108 Essentially, therefore, Justice Breyer agreed with the position taken
by the United States, that a successful application to stay Garcia's execution in
view of Vienna Convention violations can be decided aside and apart from a
determination as to whether review of his conviction would find the violation to
be harmless error.109
Next, the dissent went to great lengths to differentiate the applications of Jose
Medellin with the present case. In Medellin I, the Court was faced with an appli-
cation to stay Jose Medellin's execution where Congress had not taken any steps
to embody U.S. international legal obligations in domestic law.' 10 The Court
later refused to grant a stay of execution in a similar case because "the President
has not represented to [the Court] that there is any likelihood of congressional ...
action."'"
However, the dissent found Garcia's application to be free of the legal defects
leading to the demise of Jose Medellin's applications. In contrast, Garcia's appli-
cation was made in light of a bill introduced in the Senate "after extensive con-
sultation with the Department of State and the Department of Justice.""12 The
Solicitor General further urged the Court to grant Garcia's application for stay
such that Congress would have adequate time to carry out "the legal responsibil-
ity that this Court has held belongs to the Legislative Branch."' '3 On this basis,
104 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2868-69 (2011) (Breyer. J., dissenting).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2869 (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, Secretary
General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 2869.
110 Id. (citing Medellin 1, 552 U.S. 491, 525-26 (2008)).
"' Id. (citing Medellin II, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2009)).
112 Id. (citing U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9 (describing the Consular Notification Com-
pliance Act of 2011)).
113 Id. at 2869.
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Justice Breyer found that congressional action is a reasonable possibility, requir-
ing the Court to grant a stay under the reasoning in Medellin 11.114
Additionally, Justice Breyer also placed greater emphasis on the potentially
damaging effect that denying Garcia's stay may have on foreign relations with
Mexico." 5 Again pointing to the amicus brief filed by the Executive Branch,
Justice Breyer found persuasive the argument that failing to halt Garcia's execu-
tion would place the United States in irremediable breach of its international law
obligations.' 16 He foresaw the possibility of "serious repercussions for United
States foreign relations, law-enforcement and other cooperation with Mexico,
and the ability of American citizens traveling abroad to have the benefits of con-
sular assistance in the event of detention."' 17 These statements are buttressed by
the amicus brief filed by the Government of Mexico, stating that declining to stay
Garcia's imminent execution "would seriously jeopardize the ability of the Gov-
ernment of Mexico to continue working collaboratively with the United States on
a number of joint ventures including extraditions, mutual judicial assistance, and
our efforts to strengthen our common border.""l8 Justice Breyer reminded the
Court that such concerns are "plainly compelling."' 19 Moreover, the Court has
long recognized the special constitutionally-based authority of the President in
matters of foreign relations,120 affording significant deference to such author-
ity.121 It is Justice Breyer's contention that the majority should have respected
this deference in Garcia's case.122
The dissent concluded by stating that the Court had adequate legal authority to
grant Garcia's stay.123 Justice Breyer pointed out that under the All Writs Act
the Supreme Court may take appropriate action to preserve its "potential jurisdic-
tion." 24 With this in mind, Justice Breyer expressed his opinion that, should the
implementing bill become law by the end of September, the Supreme Court
would almost certainly grant Garcia's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the
judgment below, and remand the case for further proceedings. 125 Moreover, in
the event the bill had not yet passed, but that the Solicitor General had indicated
that it was about to become law, the Court would likely have held the petition
until the bill is enacted, and then vacate and remand the case for further consider-
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2870.
116 Id. at 2870.
117 Id. (citing U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 12).
118 Id.
''9 See id. (citing Medellin I, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)); see also
id. at 566 (Breyer. J., dissenting) (observing harms that would flow from non-compliance).
120 Id. (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
121 Id. (citing Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (noting the
Court's "customary policy deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs").
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (citing FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603 (1966)).
125 Id.
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ation in light of such legislation.12 6 In either case, he reasoned, the Court has the
appropriate authority to grant a stay with a view towards preserving its potential
jurisdiction.12 7 Accordingly, Justice Breyer argued for the dissent that such ac-
tion is appropriate and necessary in the case of Garcia.128 For Breyer, "it is
difficult to see how the State's interest in the immediate execution of an individ-
ual convicted of capital murder 16 years ago can outweigh the considerations that
support additional delay, perhaps only until the end of the summer." 29
IV. Analysis
The majority opinion in Garcia v. Texas marks a notably consistent but never-
theless incomplete approach to the obligations and rights afforded to foreign na-
tionals detained in the United States. In an increasingly globalized world,
cooperative interactions among nations depend in large part on reciprocal recog-
nition and enforcement of international obligations.13 0 The decision in Garcia v.
Texas, however, takes the diametrically opposite position, one in which the laws
of a single state predominate over those of the national government. In essence,
the Supreme Court has allowed the State of Texas to invert the Supremacy
Clause.
A. Treaty Interpretation and the Scope of International Law
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "all
treaties.. .which shall be made.. .under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
hereby."'31 Whenever a treaty operates of itself without the aid of any imple-
menting legislation, the clause has been interpreted to mean that courts should
view treaties as equivalent to an act of Congress.' 32 The outcome in Garcia's
case turned on the question of whether the ICJ's judgment in Avena is enforcea-
ble as a matter of domestic law, that is, whether it "operates of itself without the
aid" of any further legislation.' 33
As discussed above, the answer to this question requires the interpretation of
three closely intertwined treaties and one ICJ judgment. The critical inquiry,
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2870-71.
128 Id. at 2871.
129 Id.
130 See e.g. Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance With The Vienna Convention On Consular Relations
And Its Effect On Reciprocity For United States Citizens Abroad, 17 N.Y. INr'L L. Riy. 1, 10 (2004); see
also U.S. v. Superville, 40 F.Supp.2d 672, 676 (D.V.I. 1999) (explaining the importance of reciprocal
respect for international obligations created by the Vienna Convention).
131 U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl. 2.
132 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 549 (2008) (citing Foster v. Nielson, 7 L.Ed. 415
(1829)).
133 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867-69 (2011). One of the central disputes between the majority
and Justice Breyer's dissent is whether the ICJ's judgments are binding on the individual States consider-
ing the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.
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therefore, is whether the Supremacy Clause requires Texas to enforce the ICJ's
Avena judgment based on these underlying treaties. In contrast to the Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Garcia v. Texas, a more pragmatic interpretation
would seem to favor granting Garcia's application to stay his execution and peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.
In his dissent to Medellin v. Texas, Justice Breyer argued that President Bush
correctly determined that Congress need not enact additional legislation in order
for the ICJ judgment to create a binding obligation to provide review and recon-
sideration of a conviction such as Garcia's. 134 He argued that the majority places
too much weight on the treaty language, a perfunctory approach that overlooks
the intricacies and subtleties of treaty negotiation.' 3 5 In Justice Breyer's view, a
treaty has never incorporated the "unobtainable language" that will unequivo-
cally create a self-executing obligation on each individual state.136 When
presented with such a question, the Court should instead consider the language
for purposes of applying the Supremacy Clause.' 37 To further his line of reason-
ing, Justice Breyer points out that the Supreme Court has found self-executing
multilateral treaty language that is far less direct or forceful than the language in
the treaties underlying the ICJ and the Vienna Convention.' 38 Indeed, in light of
this factor, a proper interpretation requires that ICJ judgments have the effect of a
self-executing treaty, binding on the individual states notwithstanding additional
implementing legislation passed by Congress.' 39 Accordingly, in the cases of
both Medellin and Garcia, the appropriate remedy would have been to review
their respective convictions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to determine
whether the failure to notify each defendant of their Vienna Convention rights
was harmless error. Unfortunately for Garcia, the Supreme Court adopted a
markedly different approach in Medellin v. Texas, one more narrowly focused on
the explicit language of the treaty.
B. Executive Power to Implement the Avena Judgment
Moreover, just as Justice Breyer commented in his dissent in Medellin I, the
Garcia Court should have afforded greater deference to the views of the Execu-
tive. Decades earlier, Justice Jackson articulated the pertinent spectrum of exec-
utive authority in his concurring opinion to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.14 0 The president's power "is at its maximum" when he is acting "pursu-
ant to an express or implied authorization by Congress."l41 Unilateral conduct
too may fall within a second group of executive powers where Congress is silent,
134 Medellin 1, 552 U.S. at 542.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 553.
'37 Id.
138 Id. (citing e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corporation, 466 U.S. 243, 247 (1984)).
'39 Id.
140 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
141 Id.
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but where it has either expressly or impliedly acquiesced to a known and consis-
tent practice of the president.14 2 Finally, at the other end of the spectrum of
presidential powers are those that the president asserts which conflict with the
express or implied will of Congress.14 3
On February 28, 2005, President Bush signed a written determination that state
courts must provide review and reconsideration to the fifty-one Mexican nation-
als named in the Avena judgment, including Garcia, pursuant to the criteria set
forth by the ICJ.144 While it is true that the power of the president to make an
enforceable order of this nature at the time was tenuous, it is at least clear that the
Executive Branch attempted to comply with the ICJ's order. 145 Moreover, after
Avena, the United States took further measures to comply when it sent letters to
the relevant state courts and had diplomatic discussions to find alternatives for
"review and reconsideration."' 4 6 These actions show that the United States rec-
ognized the importance of compliance with the judgment to "smooth out U.S.
relations with Mexico," to help repair its international integrity with respect to
Article 36, and to encourage compliance with respect to U.S. citizens abroad.' 47
According to the Medellin Court, the pertinent constitutional question was,
"does the President's Memorandum independently require the States to provide
review and reconsideration . . . without regard to state procedural default
rules?"' 4 8 To answer this question, the Court examined two arguments that the
Executive Branch put forth as a basis for its power to issue and enforce the
memorandum. First, the president has the power to carry out the Avena judgment
because of the underlying treaties.14 9 Second, the president may have the power
to undertake "independent international dispute-resolution," allowing the presi-
dent to implement the Avena judgment.150
The Court found that the underlying international treaties did not give the
president authority to enforce the ICJ's order because the president was acting
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Presidential Memorandum to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://brown
welsh.com/Archive/2005-03-10_Avena-compliance.pdf. In his memorandum to the Attorney General,
President Bush declared:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as the President by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nation-
als (Mexico v. United States of America, 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar 31), by having State courts give effect t the
decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed
in that decision. Id.
145 Fredric L. Kirgis, The Avena Case in the International Court of Justice and the U.S. Response, 17
FEm,. SENr. R. 223, 224 (2005).
146 Scott Lyons, Breach Without Remedy in the International Forum and the Need for Self-Help: The
Conundrum Resulting from the Medellin Case, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 73, 76-77 (2009).
147 Kirgis, supra note 145, at 224.
148 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
149 Id. at 524.
150 Id.
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without congressional consent.' 5 ' The president's attempt to enforce the order
fell under the third category of Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework, the
Court found, because it was against the "implicit understanding of the ratifying
senate."' 52 Further, the Court found that the president's memorandum was
against the wishes of the ratifying Senate because it would give the Vienna Con-
vention provisions binding effect domestically, something that a non-self-execut-
ing treaty would not do.' 53 Under the third category of Youngstown, presidential
power is at its "lowest ebb," and the Court therefore rejected the president's first
argument.154
The Medellin Court further found unpersuasive the argument that the president
has "independent international dispute resolution power" that allowed him to in-
dependently give effect to the ICJ order.'55 The Court recognized presidential
unilateral authority to settle international disputes in some cases.15 6 However, it
found these cases to be limited to those that had a long history of congressional
consent to executive power to resolve specific types of international disputes. 57
Such "longstanding practice of congressional acquiescence" was not present with
the power the president was attempting to exercise in Medellin.'5 8 Instead, the
Court found the president's act to be an infringement of the federal Executive
Branch on traditional state police power and control of criminal procedure.' 59 In
light of these constitutional considerations, the Court found there to be a legal
limitation on giving full effect to the ICJ's order - namely, state limitations on
habeas petitions barred by procedural-default rules.' 60 The procedural-default
rule is the principle that claims in a habeas corpus petition that were not raised at
the appropriate time at any level of state court proceedings cannot later be re-
viewed on the merits in federal court.161 While the ICJ asked that its Avena order
be given effect despite procedural-default rules, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the order did not have the force to trump state procedural rules:
In sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an international law
obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force
constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the fil-
ing of successive habeas petitions. As we noted in Sanchez-Llamas, a
151 Id. at 527 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 530; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38.
155 Id. at 531-32.
156 Id. 531.
157 See id. at 531-32; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981).
158 Id. (quoting American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 523-26.
161 Ernst Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L. J. 1143, 1 166
(2005); see, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977) (discussing the state procedural default
rule in the context of admissibility of inculpatory statements).
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contrary conclusion would be extraordinary, given the basic rights guar-
anteed by our own Constitution do not have the effect of displacing state
procedural rules. 162
The Court found that, without the requisite self-executing treaty or legislation
by Congress, the president's memorandum was insufficient to invoke the
Supremacy Clause such that the ICJ's order could be given legal effect. 163
However, an alternative approach was offered in Justice Breyer's dissent. In
the case of Medellin, President Bush sought to implement a treaty in which the
United States agrees that the ICJ judgment is binding with respect to the Avena
parties.'6 Therefore, his actions drew upon the president's constitutional author-
ity in the arena of foreign affairs.165 In this sense, his memorandum falls within
the middle range of presidential authority where Congress has neither specifically
authorized nor specifically forbidden the presidential action.' 66
In Garcia's case, the president was arguably acting with even greater authority
because the Solicitor General's amicus brief was written and submitted against a
background of imminent legislation implementing the requirements of the Avena
judgment. No longer was Congress silent on the subject, but they had provided
an affirmative indication of passing legislation to implement the Avena judgment
as domestic law. This points to a tangential problem created by the Garcia hold-
ing, one that stems from the Court's repeated diminishing of the president's au-
thority over foreign relations. In two instances, the Court was presented with
consistent requests by the president to grant a motion to stay execution such that
the United States may come into compliance with its international obligations.' 6 7
By giving minimal deference to these requests from the Executive, the Court has
whittled away at the constitutional authority of the president and contributed to
the substantial ambiguity surrounding the balance of power existing between
these branches in the area of international relations.16 8
C. Legislative Efforts to Implement Avena
Following the Supreme Court opinion on July 14, 2008, members of the
House of Representatives introduced legislation to give the Avena judgment do-
mestic legal effect.169 The Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008 would have
granted foreign nationals such as Garcia a right to judicial review of their convic-
tions and sentences to the extent that there existed Vienna Convention viola-
162 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 522-23 (2008).
163 Id. at 532.
164 Id. at 565 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952)).
167 Id. at 501 (2008); Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2868 (2011).
168 Joshua Newcomer, Messing With Texas? Why President Bush's Memorandum Order Trumps State
Criminal Procedure, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1029, 1074 (2006).
169 See Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008) (referred to
committee, July 14, 2008).
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tions. 170 However, introduced late in the congressional term and during a
presidential election year, the bill failed to pass.' 7 ' On July 29, 2010, the Senate
Appropriations Committee included legislative language to implement the Avena
judgment as part of the Department of State Foreign Operations and Related Pro-
grams Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2011.172 This bill would have provided
federal courts with jurisdiction to review the merits of Garcia's Vienna Conven-
tion claim.17 3 Upon a finding of actual prejudice from the violation of Garcia's
consular rights, the bill would have required the court to fashion "appropriate
relief, including ordering a new trial or sentence proceeding."17 4 Again, the bill
failed to pass.' 75
Most recently, on June 14, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Consu-
lar Notification Compliance Act, which would grant Garcia access to the judicial
process required by Avena.'76 The new legislation has the full support of the
U.S. Departments of Justice and State - a fact that distinguishes this legislation
from previous congressional efforts.' 77 Significantly, the legislation provides
that a petition alleging a violation of Article 36 shall not "be considered a second
or successive habeas application or subjected to any bars to relief based on pre-
enactment proceedings other than specified in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion."' 7 8 The legislation has drawn broad support from a bipartisan array of for-
mer diplomats, business leaders, retired military leaders, and organizations
representing the millions of Americans who live, work, and travel abroad.' 79
True, as of the time that Garcia's case was decided, this landmark legislation
had not passed - nor has it yet. 80 However, the fact that it was pending at the
time the Solicitor General filed his brief lends further credence to the views enu-
merated on behalf of the Executive. No longer was the Executive Branch acting
against a background of congressional silence. Now, Congress has effectively
expressed its support for legislation that would have called for reconsideration of
170 Id.
'71 Id.
172 Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, S. 3676, 11th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 7082(a) (2010), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/-I I-s3676/text.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Garcia v. The State of
Texas, 2011 WL 2743200, *6 (June 28, 2011). "In December 2010, Congress adopted a continuing
resolution in lieu of an omnibus appropriations bill. As a result, the appropriations bill and all legislative
initiatives attached to the bill - including the Avena implementing legislation - failed to pass."
176 Consular Notification Compliance Act, S. 1194, 112th Cong., Ist Sess., § 4(a)(1) (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/IlLLS-Il2s 194is/pdf/BILLS-l 12s 194is.pdf. The proposed bill spe-
cifically authorized federal courts:
to review the merits of a petition claiming a violation of Article 36(1) (b) and (c) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, or a comparable provision of a bilateral agreement address-
ing consular notification and access, filed by a person convicted and sentenced to death by any
federal or state court prior to the date of enactment of this Act.
177 157 CONG. Ric. S3779-80 (daily ed. June 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
178 Consular Notification Compliance Act, supra note 176, § 4(a) (4).
179 U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 18.
180 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
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Garcia's case. The majority in Garcia gave short rift to this point, prematurely
giving ultimate deference to its previous holding in Medellin I without considera-
tion for the change in circumstances by the time Garcia's application was being
considered.
Viewed in a vacuum, the cases of Jose Medellin and Humberto Garcia are
identical in fact, disposition, and outcome. Both defendants met their demise at
the hands of a Texas warden despite never being appraised of their right to con-
tact the Mexican consulate. In both cases, the Supreme Court adhered to a strict
interpretation of U.S. international obligations under the Vienna Convention and
the treaties underlying the ICJ. In both cases, the Supreme Court's interpretation
departed from prior notions of interpretation, instead favoring a narrow interpre-
tation. And in both cases, the Supreme Court gave Texas state criminal law a
higher priority than the nation's obligations to the international community. At
least for the time being, the laws of a single state have become the law of the
land.
V. Impact
The holding in Garcia v. Texas represents a departure from both the interna-
tional treaty obligations of the United States as well as a weakening of the presi-
dent's authority over matters affecting foreign affairs. In the former area of law,
the Supreme Court's holding detracts from the United States' status in the inter-
national community and reinforces the unreasonably high bar set for implement-
ing international treaty obligations as U.S. law established in Medellin I. In the
latter area, the holding and ultimate execution of Garcia may have yet-to-be real-
ized detrimental effects on the diplomatic relations between the United States and
Mexico.
A. Uncertainty Over Who Governs Foreign Affairs
By virtue of the high standard for creating domestic treaty obligations, the
Supreme Court has created a seemingly insurmountable hurdle for federal com-
pliance, especially where compliance requires cooperation between federal and
state governments. The bar was raised further in the Garcia case because of the
Court's consistent disregard of efforts by the Executive Branch to implement and
comply with the Vienna Convention's reciprocal obligations. On the one hand,
the Court has recognized the power of the president to unilaterally take action
that may conflict with traditional areas of state deference with the goal of produc-
ing uniformity in dealings with foreign governments.' 8 ' For example, in Ameri-
can Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court held that valid
executive agreements can preempt state law, even in areas of "traditional compe-
tence," where state action impedes the exercise of the president's authority over
foreign affairs.182 On the other hand, however, the Garcia majority again ne-
181 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415-16 (2003) (finding that nationwide uniformity in
dealings with foreign affairs may require states to yield to national government action).
182 Id. at 413-14.
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glected executive action demanding compliance with the Avena judgment, a uni-
lateral presidential act deriving legitimacy from the Constitution.
Arguably, President Bush's Memorandum demanding the States "discharge
[U.S.] international obligations under [the Avena Case]" still applied to Garcia's
case by the time it reached the Supreme Court, yet the Court similarly neglected
it. Though congressional silence would have been sufficient to indicate its tacit
approval of the Executive's view, Congress had expressed an unambiguous indi-
cation of the importance of U.S. compliance with both the Vienna Convention
and the Avena judgment.' 8 3 Executive action in this case seems particularly im-
portant as it pertains to these obligations because the failure of only one state to
comply would leave the union of all the states in breach of a federal obligation to
the international community.184
The most consistent barrier to compliance is the Supreme Court's ongoing
refusal to find that federal action may trump state criminal procedural default
rules. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Court affirmed that state procedural
default rules essentially bar reconsideration of a fully exhausted criminal verdict,
even where violations of the Vienna Convention are involved.' 8 5 However, both
Congress and the Executive have tentatively expressed that this doctrine does not
apply to the named foreign nationals of the Avena judgment, an expression con-
sistently ignored by the Supreme Court.18 6 For the time being, therefore, the
Garcia case creates an uncertain precedent, as it does not conform with basic
principles that date back to Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure
Cases, nor can it be reconciled with a modern understanding of the president's
role in foreign affairs.' 87
B. Damage to Mexico-U.S. Relations
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention recognizes the crucial role a consulate
may play in the defense of its citizens abroad.' 88 The United States has consist-
ently emphasized the importance of allowing detained or arrested foreign nation-
als access to their consulates.' 8 9 Consular officers may provide legal assistance
183 See Consular Notification and Compliance Act, supra note 176; see also Congressional Record,
supra note 177.
184 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ 12, 1 120-22
(Mar. 31) (noting that each foreign national - detained, convicted, and sentenced across many states -
were entitled to reconsideration).
185 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2673 (2006) (affirming application of state procedural
default rules to the Vienna Convention, even where the state of Oregon conceded that police violated the
Convention's consular notification provisions).
186 Kevin D. Klagge, Transnational Constitutional Law-Proposed Legislation With Executive Sup-
port To Enact International Court's Decision Does Not Justify Stay Of Execution-Garcia V. Texas, 131
S. Ct. 2866 (2011), 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 233, 240-42 (2012) (discussing the various expres-
sions of Congressional and Executive support for staying an execution in view of Vienna Convention
violations and their respective rejection by the Supreme Court).
187 Newcomer, supra note 168, at 1057.
188 Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36(1) (a)-(c).
189 Yury A. Kolesnikov, Meddling with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Dilemma
and Proposed Statutory Solution, 40 McGEORGE3 L. REv. 179, 184-85 (2009).
Volume 9, Issue 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 367
Don't Mess With Texas
in addition to minimizing the challenges raised by differences in culture, lan-
guage, and the varying legal systems.190
To be sure, some countries pour a great deal of resources and effort into the
defense of their nationals in the United States. For example, Mexico makes ex-
tensive assistance available to Mexican nationals detained in the United States.191
In capital cases like that of Humberto Garcia, the government of Mexico funds
the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program which provides assistance to de-
fense counsel for Mexican nationals by providing sample briefs and references to
experts. 19 2 Additionally, Mexico has greater access to information about their
nationals and can assist a defendant by researching mitigating circumstances
more thoroughly than domestic defense counsel.' 93
In addition to upholding domestic principles of justice, the United States has a
strong international interest in complying with its Article 36 obligations in order
to maintain international integrity and to protect its citizens abroad. As a general
matter, a treaty "depends for enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
honor of the governments which are parties to it."94 There are 173 parties to the
Vienna Convention, all with the expectation that Article 36 creates a reciprocal
relationship.19 5 The United States has an interest in protecting its citizens to the
fullest extent possible in the face of a law that it deems unacceptable.
Most Americans would be justifiably appalled if a U.S. citizen in a foreign
country were charged, convicted, and executed for a capital crime without being
advised of a right to contact the U.S. embassy for help. Such was the case of
Billy Hayes, who openly protested Garcia's execution.196 His terrifying experi-
ence in a Turkish prison gave rise to the book and subsequent film "Midnight
Express." 97 In a letter to the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, he high-
lighted the vulnerability of Americans detained overseas and asked the Board to
grant a stay of the execution so that Congress can address "this vitally important
concern." 98 In both the account of his days in a Turkish prison and his letter, he
190 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AcciESS MANUAL, at 31 (3d ed. 2010), avail-
able at http://travel.state.govlaw/consular/consular_753.html (click on link to the 3rd Edition of the
Manual).
191 U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 23 (2008).
192 Foreign Nationals: Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program (MCLAP), INT'L JUSTICE PROJECT,
http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/nationalsResources.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
193 Nancy Alexander, Saved By the States? The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Federal
Government Shortcomings, and Oregon's Rescue, 15 Liewis & CLARK L. Riv. 819, 823 (2011).
194 Medellin v. Texas (Medellin 1), 552 U.S. 491, 508-09 (2008) (quoting Edye v. Robinson ("Head
Money Cases"), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
195 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N. TREATY COLLE1C'ION, http://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (click on ch. 3, and § 8 to see a full
list of signing countries); Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 36.
196 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 18-19, Garcia v. Thaler, No. 5:11-cv-482-OLG
(W.D. Texas, June 16, 2011).
197 Bill Mears and Nick Valencia, One Mexican's Death Row Case Spills Far Beyond Border of
Texas, CNN JUSTICE, July 3, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-03/justice/texas.death.row I _mexi-
can-consulate-death-row-mexican-officials?_s=PM:CRIME.
198 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 196, at 19.
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repeatedly reinforced how U.S. consular assistance was critical to his ability to
obtain legal counsel.' 99
An indication of Mexico's apprehension with respect to the U.S. implementa-
tion of the Vienna Convention's reciprocal obligations has been clearly
voiced.200 With respect to Garcia's defense, the Mexican government made ex-
plicit a longstanding tradition of extending consular services to its nationals, par-
ticularly where that national faces capital punishment.20' The United States'
neighbor to the south further forecasted that Garcia's execution "would seriously
jeopardize the ability of the government of Mexico to continue working col-
laboratively with the United States on a number of joint ventures including extra-
ditions, mutual judicial assistance, and our efforts to strengthen our common
border." 202 If it was an articulation of the potential damage to foreign relations
that may result from Garcia's demise, the Garcia majority needed to look no
further than this statement. Considering the recent nature of this decision, the
fallout for the United States is yet to be realized in many ways.
One thing remains clear: availability of a judicial remedy is essential to the
American legal system - however, such a judicial remedy is not readily available
to a foreign national whose rights have been violated under the Vienna
Convention. 203
VI. Conclusion
The principles of treaty interpretation gleaned from the Medellin cases and
affirmed in Garcia v. Texas are a temporary resolution of debates that will last
well beyond the term of the current Supreme Court. However, the holding of
Garcia v. Texas puts the United States in violation of its international obligations
under the Vienna Convention and represents a clear disregard for the obligations
created by the ICJ decision in Avena. Moreover, the Court has further dimin-
ished the President's constitutional authority over foreign relations and may have
irreparably harmed U.S. relations with Mexico. Flowing from this case is the
notion that each individual state - like Texas - has the ultimate responsibility for
bringing the United States into compliance with the Vienna Convention.2 04
199 Id.
200 U.S. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 23.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Lyons, supra note 146, at 77.
204 In fact, certain States have recognized the importance of complying with the Avena judgment. For
example, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed execution of a named Mexican national and
ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether actual prejudice had resulted from the lack of consular notifi-
cation. Torres v. Oklahoma, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). On the same day, the Gover-
nor of Oklahoma reduced Torres' death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. See Oklahoma
Governor Grants Clemency to Mexican Foreign National, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/node/492 (last visited Mar, 15, 2012). Additionally, Oregon has taken steps to ensure
that Oregon police are aware of their duties under the Vienna Convention and have passed legislation
requiring state police officers to be aware of and understand the Vienna Convention rights. Alexander,
supra note 193, at 842.
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